The paper shows how role-based access control (RBAC) models could be implemented using CORBA Security service. A configuration of CORBA protection system is defined.
Introduction
Role-based access control (RBAC) [SCFY96] is a family of reference models in which permissions are associated with roles and users are assigned to appropriate roles. A role can represent competency, authority, responsibility or specific duty assignments.
Some variations of RBAC include the capability to establish relations between roles, between permissions and roles, and between users and roles. There are four established RBAC reference models: unrelated roles (RBACo), role-hierarchies (RBACl), user and role assignment constraints (RBACz), and both include RBAC as one of the required alternatives
At the same time, the commercial market is experiencing the spread of systems based on Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) technology. CORBA is a versatile object-based distributed computing technology, which is becoming a worldwide industry standard for constructing distributed software systems. CORBA standardization process is based .on the consensus of over 800 software companies. The computing model that CORBA adheres to is outlined in Object Management Architecture (OMA) [SS95] . The CORBA environment, including CORBA Security Service, provides a general-purpose infrastructure for developing and deploying distributed object systems in a broad range of specialized vertical domains. CORBA Security service (CS) defines the interfaces to a collection of objects for enforcing a range of security policies using diverse security mechanisms.
It provides abstraction from an underlying security technology so that CORBA-based applications could be independent from the particular security infrastructure provided by a user enterprise computing environment. Due to its general nature, CS is not tailored to any particular access control model. Instead, it defines a general mechanism which is supposed to be adequate for the majority of cases and could be configured to support various access control models. For example, it is shown in [Kar96] how to implement lattice-based MAC using the CORBA authorization model. In the next few years we expect to witness significant financial investments in the enterprise-wide deployment of CS in commercial and government organizations, including those who will construct their security policies utilizing RBAC concepts. It is important to foresee if CS will fully support RBAC models. However, we are not aware of any work in the research community that has explored the potential of CS for support of RBAC reference models.
In this paper we present an approach for implementing RBAC models using the access control mechanism provided by CS. We define a configuration of CS protection system. Then we define RBACo and RBACl implementations in terms of CS framework and describe how RBACo-RBAC3 could be implemented in CS. We illustrate the discussion with several examples. Our approach allows an implementation compliant with CS specification to support RBACO. Additional functionality, which is beyond CS specification scope, should be implemented in order to support RBACl and/or RBAC2. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the access control model of CS and defines a configuration of the CORBA protection system; Section 3 defines RBAC models using CS concepts and shows a possible implementation of RBACO-RBACZ using CS with illustration on an example role hierarchy; Section 4 concludes the paper.
CORBA Access Control Model
In this section, we first informally describe the CORBA Access Control model. Then, we formally define a configuration of the CORBA Protection System state.
Informal Description
The CORBA environment, including CORBA Security Service, provides a general-purpose infrastructure for developing and deploying distributed object-based systems in a broad range of specialized vertical domains. All entities in the CORBA computing model are identified with interfaces defined in the OMG Interface Definition Language (IDL). A CORBA interface is a collection of three things:
operations, attributes, and exceptions. An implementation of a CORBA interface is called a CORBA object. Hence, we use "CORBA object" or just '<object" to mean "implementation of a CORBA interface", where it does not cause confusion.
Object functionality is exposed to other CORBA-based applications only through the corresponding interfaces.
Objects have object references by which they can be referenced.
An object reference is a handle through which one requests operations on the object.
The CS model comprises the following functionalities visible to application developers and security administrators: identification and authentication, authorization and access control, auditing, integrity and confidentiality protection, authentication of clients and target objects, optional non-repudiation, administration of security policies and related information.
One of the objectives of CS is to be totally unobtrusive to application developers. Security-unaware objects should be able to run securely on a secure ORB without any active involvement on the site of application objects. In the meantime, it must be possible for security-aware objects to exercise stricter security policies than the ones enforced by CS. In the CS model, all object invocations are mediated by the appropriate security functions in order to enforce various security policies such as access control. A simplified schema of control points in CS model is represented in Figure 1 . Those functions are part of CS and are tightly integrated with the ORB because all messages between CORBA objects and clients are passed through the ORB.
CS uses the notion of principal. "A principul is a human user or system entity that is registered in and authentic to the system" [Obj98] . In translation to the traditional security terminology, a principal is a subject. CS manages access control policies based on the security attributes of principals and attributes of objects as well as operations implemented by those objects. As it can be seen in Figure 1 , the client-side and targetside invocation access policy governs whether the client can invoke the requested operation on the target object on behalf of the current principal.
This policy is enforced by the ORB in cooperation with the security service it uses for all (security-aware and unaware) applications. A client may invoke an operation on the target object as specified in the request only if this is allowed by the object invocation access policy. A user uses a User-Sponsor1 to authenticate to the CS environment ( it prompts the user for user name and password. All a principal does in the CORBA computational model is invoke operations on corresponding objects. In order to make a request one needs to know two things: object reference, which uniquely identifies an object, and operation name. CORBA interfaces can inherit from other CORBA interfaces via interface inheritance.
An operation name is unique for an interface.3 Thus, any operation is uniquely identified by its name and by the name of the interface it is defined in.
In this paper, we use notation ikmlz, to refer to n-th operation on k-th interface.
There is a global4 set of required rights for each operation defined by its interface's required rights mapping. to invoke the operation. CS specification purposefully does not define how the operation combines rights granted through different privilege attribute entries in Table 3 . The specifiers let CS implementors define the operation's internal behavior ([Obj98, p. 1221) . A simplest implementation of get-effective-rights could be when the set of rights granted to a principal is a union of rights granted to every security attribute the principal has. For our examples, we will assume exactly this implementation of the operation.
If we use our example of security attributes assigned to principals pl , p2, ~3, and p4 (Table  l) , and the examples of required (Table 2 ) and granted (Table 3) rights, then •J Function effective-rights looks up GRM to obtain granted rights for each attribute in all domains to which o belongs. It combines those rights according to its implementation and returns effective rights for each domain. Results returned from effective-rights serve as input parameters for the function combine. The latter combines them according to its implementation.
Rights returned by combine are checked against RRM. If the match succeeds, then access is granted. Otherwise, access is denied. Second, Since ikm, E irm, e k G l Ap 3 q (i.e. just p G q iS not enough for ikr?$ E ilm,), as in Table 6 , the semantics of operations in a general case might be different.
Thus, for each subject s and object o, the content of cell [s,o] is specific to the object, i.e. no operations permitted on one object could be permitted on another object because operations are semantically different for every interface unless interfaces are related via inheritance.
Third, all implementations of the same interface in a given access policy domain are represented by the same object in the access matrix; therefore, implementations of the same interface are indistinguishable from the access control point of view. This is one of the reasons policy domains are important in the CORBA access control model. PA C R x A, a many-to-many assignment of granted rights to security attributes of type role relation.
UA C U x A, a many-to-many user to security attributes of type role assignment relation.
gWe do not mention CS AC domains because, as it will be shown in the example on Page 9, RBAC models can be supported in CORBA using a single domain.
user : P -+ U, a function mapping each principal pi to the single user user(pi), constant for the principal lifetime, and with the RBAG-, definition provided in [SCFY96] .
G iven the definition, we will show how a CORBA protection system specified by a configuration language from Definition 2.1 could be used to implement a security system compliant to this definition of RBACe.
PA relation is specified by granted rights matrix GRM. UA relation is managed by user administrators in CS that define what values of attributes of type ro2e are assigned to users. However such management functionality is beyond the scope of CS specification, which means that functionality defined by UA relation is implementation-specific.
An implementation of PrincipalAuthenticator1° initializes new principal credentials with security attributes according to UA. An example is provided in Table 1 , where attributes ai through us have the type role. The value of the principal's privilege attribute of the type AccessId is equivalent to the return value from the function user. An implementation of PrincipalAuthenticator should initialize principal credentials according to the function roles. Since a user in RBACe can activate any subset of roles the user is assigned to, implementation of UA ensures implementation of RBACe. Thus, we have shown that all relations, functions and sets specified in Definition 3.1 can be directly supported by CS-compliant implementations.
In order for a CS implementation to support RBACe it should:
1.
2.
3.
comply with CS standard, and provide a means to administrate user-to-role assignment relation UA, and provide a means for users to select through UserSponsor a set of roles with which they would like to activate the new principal, and 'OAs it was described in Section 2, a PrincipalAuthenticator 
RBACI: Role Hierarchies
RBACi is RBACe with role hierarchies. RBACi (the definition reprint is available in Appendix) in the language of CS is formally defined as follows: A user provides to a UserSponsor a set of roles which they want the principal to be activated with. The PrincipalAuthenticator, during the authentication phase with the UserSponsor, creates new credentials of the principal. The credentials have requested by user roles provided that they satisfy the definition of function roles for RBACi. A valid implementation of RBACl could be one that allows a user to specify any role junior to those the user is a member of. In this case, an implementation of PrincipaZAuthenticator activates all roles which are junior to the specified role.
In order for a CS implementation to support RBACi it should:
1. implement RBACe, and 2. provide a means to administrate the role hierarchy relation RH, and 3. implement PrincipalAuthenticator which creates principal credentials containing privilege attributes of the type role according to relations UA and RH, as well as the function roles.
RBACZ: Constraints
Constraints in RBAC are predicates that apply to UA and PA relations and the user and roEes functions ([SCFY96] ). Constraints on UA relation are to be enforced by an implementation of user administrator tools. Constraints on the functions user and roles are the responsibility of PrincipaZAuthenticator implementation.
Constraints on PA relation are to be enforced by an implementation of security administrator tools.
In order for a CS implementation to support RBACs it should:
2.
4.
implement RBACs, and implement support of constraints on UA relation user administrator tools, and implement PrincipalAuthenticator with support of constraints on functions user and ro-oles, and enable enforcement of constraints on PA relation by security administration tools.
RBAC3: RBACl + RBACz
RBACs is a combination of RBACi and RBAC2 along with possibly additional constrains on the role hierarchy. It can be implemented in CS as well. Obviously, in order for a CS implementation to support RBACs it should:
1. implement RBACi , 2. implement RBACz, and 3. implement possible additional constrains on the role hierarchy.
Requirements for support of RBACl and RBACs by CORBA Security service implementation have been already discussed. Implementation of additional static constrains on the RBAC1 role hierarchy is to be done by user administrator tools. For the support dynamic constrains, additional functionality in the implementation of PrincipalAuthenticator is required, in addition to the administrator tools.
Example
To illustrate the points made in this section, we describe a protection state of a CORBA system defined by Definition 2.1 that implements an example role hierarchy. We use an example hierarchy from [SP98] shown in Figure  3 . We will show how a CORBA-based distributed system could be configured to support RBACi with an example hierarchy shown on Figure 3 
2.
4.
Anyone can look up an employee's name and experience.
Everyone in the engineering department can get a description of and report problems regarding any project.
Engineers, assigned to projects, can make changes and review changes related to their projects.
Quality engineers can inspect the quality of projects they are assigned to. 6. Project leaders can close problems.
7. The director can manage employees (assign them to projects, un-assign them from projects, add new records to their experience, and fire) and close engineering projects.
We define that effective-rights returns a union of granted rights per attribute. We define that combine returns a union of rights granted in each domain.
Single Access Policy Domain Solution
In order to implement the role hierarchy in CS without using access policy domains, we introduce two new interfaces EngineetingProject1
and EngineeringProject2, as shown in Figure 6 . The following configuration of a system protection state could be used: A = {e, ed, el, e2, pel,pe2, gel, qe2, pll, ~12, dir}.
All these attributes have type role. R = {gn, atp, ufp, ae, ge, f, mcl, rcl, iql, rpl, cpl, cnrl, gdl, cl, mc2, rc2, iq2, rp2, cp2, cnr2, gd2 In the IDM, all interface instances are in members of the only access policy domain.
l GRM is shown in Table 8 .
The CORBA protection system configuration described above allows enforcement of the sample. policies listed on Page 8. For example, a lead of project 1 with role pll activated is able to invoke operations get-name and get-experience on all implementations of interface Employee as well as all but close operations on all implementations of interface EngineeringProjectl.
llWe used first letters of each operation to create a corresponding right.
lzWe could have used "any" as well.
When an operation's required rights set consists of only one right, the effect of either combinator is the same.
Privilege Attribute
The work presented in this paper sets up a framework for implementing as well as for assessing implementations of RBAC models using CS. It provides directions for CS developers to realizing RBAC in their systems. It gives criteria to users for selecting such CS implementations that support models from the RBACe-RBAC3 family.
Pll e2 I CPl mc2, rc2 w2 cnrl I qe2 iql P12 cpl dir atp, ufp, ae, f, cl, c2 From observing the configuration of the CORBA protection system in this solution, significant administrative overhead could be noticed.
The overhead is due to the gratuitous use of a separate interface (EngineeringProject(l,2)) per project . This is because we purposefully limited our solution to a single access policy domain. It could be easily shown how the unnecessary redundancy of protection system configuration data is eliminated by using access policy domains and a hierarchy of such domains. We omit the description of a solution with multiple domains due to space limitation.
4

Conclusions
In this paper, we provided a definition of protection system configuration for CORBA Security service (CS). We defined RBACe and RBACi models in the language of CS and described how RBACe-RBACs could be implemented in CS. We discussed what functionality needs to be implemented, besides compliance with CS standard, in order to support RBAC models by CS. We illustrated the discussion with a single access policy domain example of CS protection system configuration, which supports a sample role-hierarchy and access policies. Implementations compliant with the'CS specification can support RBACe-RBACs.
However, additional functionality non-specified by CS is required. Implementations of PrincipalAuthenticator interface and UserSponsor need to be aware of roles and their hierarchies (RBACi).
To support constraints (RBACz), a PrincipalAuthenticator has to enforce corresponding constraints.
Tools to administer user-to-role and role-torights relations are also required.
